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Among the central problems of LDCs is the poor performance of their 
public enterprises (PEs), and the limited ability of governments and other 
agencies to improve this performance. In practice, a typical funding agency 
possesses extremely few levers to improve the performance of an ongoing PE, 
with perhaps the most potent lever being negotiation over the conditionality 
for original funding. The present paper suggests a more effective use of 
such limited levers. 
We propose that project authorities should be asked and induced to 
undertake two kinds of pre-commitments at the time of funds approval; a pre­
commitment to: (i) link a non-negligible part of the project's employees' 
compensation to the actual PE performance (we call this the "profit-sharing 
pre-commitment"), and (ii) liquidate the project if its ex-post performance 
falls below some threshold level (we call this the "liquidation pre­
commitment"). Inducements might include making the availability and softness 
of funding contingent upon such pre-commitments. 
We discuss three primary sources of PE losses (namely, conventional 
allocational inefficiencies, X-inefficiencies, and project irreversibility 
due to "soft budget constraints"), compare the likely relative magnitudes of 
associated losses, and argue how incentive pre-commitments would help amel­
iorate these losses. A simple illustration of the likely large order of 
magnitude of the "option" value of gains from reversibility is also pre­
sented. 
This paper places a central emphasis on pre-commitments because, given 
the political-economic environment of an LDC, the feasibility of remedial 
actions is greatly reduced if provisions for such actions have not already 
been agreed upon in advance--and understood by the parties involved--at the 
project approval stage. Also, the basic idea of pre-commitments is not in 
conflict with other approaches for improving PE performance. 
This paper does not take a position on whether PEs are or are not de­
sirable. Under the premise that PEs are likey to remain important in LDCs 
in the foreseeable future, our objective is to develop some constructive 
steps towards improving PE performance. The proposed pre-commitments rep­
resent such a step because even though these pre-commitments will not solve 
all or most of the problems of PEs, and even though the magnitude of the re­
sulting overall benefit would vary across situations, it is difficult to 
imagine scenarios where such pre-commitments could actually harm PE perform­
ance. By contrast, many scenarios can be envisioned where incentive pre­
commitments and accountability will improve PE performance. 
A PROPOSAL FOR USING INCENTIVE PRE-COMMITMENTS 
IN PUBLIC ENTERPRISE FUNDING 
Raaj Kumar Sah and Martin L. Weitzman 
Improving the performance of public organizations is a widely felt 
need at the present time. It has been articulated in different political 
contexts- - in the socialist economies such as China and the USSR, in the 
mixed economies of LDCs, and in the market-oriented economies of North 
America and Western Europe. It has also been recognized that economic in-
centives and accountability must play a fundamental role in improving the 
performance of public organizations. 
The objective of this paper is to propose and argue that the perform­
ance of public projects and enterprises in LDCs might be improved if some 
modest yet important changes are made in the procedures through which public 
projects are initially approved and funded, especially by external funding 
organizations. In particular, we explore the ramifications of having pro-
ject authorities undertake pre-commitments, at the time of project approval, 
to link some part of employee compensation to enterprise performance, and to 
liquidate the enterprise if its performance falls below some pre-specified 
threshold level. The idea of these pre-commitments is not in conflict with 
other approaches for improving the performance of public enterprises; We 
argue that such pre-commitments are likely to have beneficial effects on the 
overall returns from public investments. 
We begin, in Section I, with a very brief introduction to some of the 
problems associated with public enterprises (PEs) in LDCs. The objective is 
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only to set the stage for later analysis. A comprehensive review is not 
necessary here because the central features of the "public enterprise syn­
drome" are sufficiently well known to almost everyone with field experi-
1 
ence. 
In Section II, we discuss the economic nature of three primary sources 
of losses in public enterprises: conventional allocational inefficiencies, 
X-inefficiencies, and the irreversibility of projects due to "soft budget 
constraints." We argue that the losses due to irreversibility are likely to 
be larger than those due to X-inefficiencies and the latter, in turn, are 
likely to be larger than those due to allocational inefficiencies. 
In Section III, we explain why, and argue, that incentive pre­
commitments might be a possible way of alleviating some of the problems of 
PEs. This section also illustrates that large gains can be achieved if 
projects have built-in reversibility (that is, if they can be scaled down or 
liquidated when it is socially desirable to do so). 
The next two ~ections deal briefly with issues concerning the imple­
mentation of pre-commitments. In Section IV, we discuss the mechanics of 
operationalization. Section V contains a discussion of some objections 
which might be raised against pre-commitments of the kind discussed in the 
paper. 
I. BACKGROUND 
There has been an unambiguous increase in the importance of public 
enterprises in LDCs since the mid-1960s. While PEs account for about 10 
percent of the GDP of developed and developing countries taken together, 
this percentage is as high as 30 to 40 for several LDCs. PEs have been 
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established by LDC governments for a variety of economic, sociopolitical 
and hybrid motives. Among the presumed reasons have been the desire to 
force-draft savings, the desire to bridge the entrepreneurial gap by under­
taking projects which might otherwise not be undertaken, the desire to 
control the "commanding heights" of the economy, and the desire to dilute 
the concentration· of economic power held by a few large business groups. 
Donor agencies' policies have also been a significant influence, particu­
larly during the 1970s when several donor organizations appeared to have 
exhibited a preference toward PE investment. 
It has been increasingly recognized that the rise and the current 
importance of PEs in LDCs is best viewed as a consequence of political­
economic forces in these countries and throughout the world at large. For 
instance, the "nobler" goals of PEs (such as employment creation, establish­
ment of new industries and reduction in the concentration of economic power) 
have in the past received, and continue to receive, vocal support from sev­
eral segments of the LDC population. At the same time, the poor performance 
of PEs and their cost to the economy--to the extent these costs are visible-
-have increasingly become a source of popular frustration. How the scope 
and the importance of PEs changes in LDCs in the future would depend in part 
on how the political forces supporting different perceptions of PEs balance 
one another and, in particular, on what role is played by those organized 
groups whose interests are directly affected by PEs. The premise on which 
our present proposals are based is that the proportion of the LDC resources 
committed to PEs will remain sizable for the foreseeable future, even though 
this proportion may undergo some decline from the current level. 
Performance: PEs have in general performed disappointingly relative to 
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their economic potential or relative to the economic motivations which might 
have spawned them. Their performance has perhaps not been any better with 
respect to other social goals, even though such an assessment cannot be made 
with precision, given the relative lack of framework, data and analysis. 
The simplest indicators o~ PE performance are their profit and loss 
·accounts. Using these, several studies have shown that the aggregate prof- -
2
itability of PEs has lagged behind that of the private sector. More dis-
aggregated studies support similar conclusions. The persistence of poor 
financial returns has scuttled one main aim of creating PEs, that their sur­
pluses would contribute to development efforts in other parts of the 
economy. In addition, EE external borrowings have been significant and have 
contributed to the current debt problems of LDCs. 3 
Concerning the performance of PEs on criteria other than financial 
ones, the prevailing opinion (which we share) is that performance on socio-
economic criteria has been below expectations. It has been widely noted, 
for instance, that PEs have created very little direct employment because of 
their typically high capital intensity, and that induced employment crea-
tion has perhaps also been insubstantial. Further, a common argument sup-
porting PEs has been that, since there are very few instruments for income 
redistribution in LDCs, the pricing of the outputs of some of the PEs can 
serve to redistribute income. There are natural economic limitations, how-
4 ever, to such an approach. Also, given the waste and inefficiencies 
associated with typical PEs, it is unlikely that any significant redistribu­
tion to the poor has actually taken place through this mechanism. 
A highly visible aspect of PEs in most LDCs is that a number of enter­
prises have continued to operate even though they are imposing, and would 
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continue to impose, large costs on the economy. At one extreme, there are 
PEs where abandoning the enterprise would be better for the economy even if 
all present employees continued receiving their compensation for their re­
maining work life; that is, the value of the output of such PEs does not 
even cover the non-wage costs of operations. 
Given the importance of PEs in LDCs and the level of dissatisfaction· 
with their performance, it is not surprising that an extensive debate has 
taken place on how to deal with these problems. One obvious reaction has 
been that the existing PEs should be divested through various means such as 
privatization and plant closing and no fresh investment should be put into 
existing or new PEs. This reaction has obvious justifications in many cir­
cumstances. Yet, given the political economy of most LDCs, it is unlikely 
5that such an approach would find wide acceptance. 
Other approaches have aimed at policy reforms at different levels. At 
the economy-wide level, for instance, it has been argued that external trade 
and domestic credit_ policies should be altered so that PEs not only receive 
economically relevant signals but also the costs of PEs become explicit 
rather than being partly hidden, as is often the case at present. At the 
industry level, it has been argued that PEs should face more extensive pri­
vate competition, domestic as well as external. Some studies have indicated 
the need for enterprise-specific reforms; in particular, reforms concerning 
the degree and nature of., autonomy of PEs from government control, .and re-, 
forms concerning the staffing and structure of PE management. 
The proposals which we discuss later have a somewhat different emphasis 
in that they are aimed at influencing the economic premises and the disci­
plinary environment under which PE investment is undertaken. Our proposals 
6 
are thus not in conflict with, nor a substitute for, the ongoing need for 
reforms of the type described above. In fact the pressure for undertaking 
certain types of reforms (particularly, enterprise-specific reforms) might 
well be strengthened by the presence of incentive pre-commitments. 
II. NATURE OF LOSSES UNDER PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 
To understand the sources of poor performance of PEs, we find it useful 
to subdivide the efficiency or welfare losses into three broad categories: 
(i) Traditional allocational inefficiencies from the wrong factor and 
. 6
dpro uct mix. 
(ii) X-inefficiencies that arise, essentially, from lack of motiva-
tion or effort to use economic opportunities as effectively as they might 
7be used. 
(iii) Inability to shut down or scale back operations when losses are 
incurred, due to the "soft budget constraint" laxity that the government 
8typically permits public enterprises. 
Traditional allocational inefficiencies arising from the wrong factor 
and product mix, of type (i) above, form a central theme of traditional 
price theory. Trade distortions, effects of imperfect competition and mar­
kets, tax and subsidy distortions, and effects of incorrect price setting 
are all familiar subjects falling in this category. In many cases, the 
forces generating these inefficiencies are economy-wide or industry-wide 
government policies, rather than enterprise specific policies. Most attempts 
by economists to understand efficiency losses in LDCs and elsewhere have 
focused on these areas. 
We in no way desire to minimize losses of this traditional sort. In 
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many specific instances inefficiency losses of type (i) have been shown to 
be substantial. But our belief is that losses of type (i) are usually less 
important in practice than losses of type (ii) or (iii). This is because 
inefficiency losses of type (i) are quadratic or second-order in a well de­
9fined sense, which in many practical cases means losses of not overwhelming 
. d 10magnitu e. 
X-inefficiency losses are also fairly well known. Although it is dif­
ficult to make precise estimates of the magnitude of these type (ii) losses, 
arguably they are substantially larger than type (i) losses are likely to 
be. Leibenstein (1981) cites studies whose figures suggest that the magni­
tude of X-inefficiency losses at any one time in the United States may be 
between 20 to 40 percent of net national product. These numbers seem high, 
but even if they are somewhat off the mark, inefficiency of type (ii) is 
likely to be a more serious matter than inefficiency of type (i) because of 
the difference between first- and second-order losses. The differences in 
organizational motivation or effort (primarily due to differences in incen­
tive mechanisms) are held by some to be a major cause of the large differ­
ences in productivity which have been observed across countries with 
11alternative economic systems. 
The third type of inefficiency, due to de facto public project irre­
versibility, is probably least well understood in development economics 
·· because much of the technical literature is .recent (typically •involving 
stochastic diffusion processes), and it has been applied mostly to situa-
tions with well-developed capital markets. Yet these type (iii) ineffi-
ciency losses, we believe, are likely to be the largest in magnitude of the 
three classes enumerated above. As we show later, it is not uncommon to 
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find that with even moderate levels of uncertainty, the opportunity value 
of project reversibility can be surprisingly large, and an investment rule 
that ignores it will be grossly in error. 
A primary source of inefficiency of type (iii) is that workers, man­
agers and bureaucrats view themselves as having acquired various kinds of 
de facto property rights to continued employment (typically within the same 
enterprise) once they have been employed in a particular PE. These workers 
and managers, then, impose significant political costs on the government if 
it were to attempt to deny or curtail their employment property rights. The 
resulting political costs are sufficiently large for the government that it 
tends to bail out failing PEs even though the resulting costs may sometimes 
be enormous. 
III. VALUE OF INCENTIVE PRE-COMMITMENTS 
If one asks the general question why losses of the kinds described 
above occur in PEs,' the almost universal answer is that there are either no 
incentives or wrong incentives to avoid such losses. The lack of a payment 
or reward system linked to profitability breeds apathy and vested interest 
in the status quo. Without motivation to seek and maintain high levels of 
profitability, traditional allocational inefficiencies of type (i) and in­
sufficient effort leading to type (ii) inefficiency are bound to arise. Once 
pay and job security are insured more or less independently of economic 
performance, it is politically very difficult to shut down or scale back a 
failing enterprise, giving rise to type (iii) inefficiency. 
The need to introduce appropriate incentives is, therefore, self­
evident. We believe that this task can be more easily achieved if a funding 
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agency is in a position to negotiate and impose pre-commitments for incen­
tive mechanisms, at the very beginning of project funding, as a not unreas­
onable pre-condition for receiving the loan and support. In particular, it 
would be useful to introduce two types of pre-commitments: (a) a profit-
sharing pre-commitment stipulating that a non-negligible part of the compen­
sation of managers and workers would be systematically linked .to enterprise. 
performance, and (b) a liquidation pre-commitment stipulating that the pub­
lic enterprise will be liquidated (through the sale of assets and control) 
if its cumulative performance at pre-specified dates in the future is not 
above certain threshold levels. 
There has been little or no systematic analysis or evaluation in the 
past of the idea that a poorly performing PE should be automatically liqui­
dated according to a pre-specified schedule. In contrast, the general idea 
that the compensation of employees should be made sensitive to an enter-
. ' f . b . 1prises per ormance is o vious y not new. 
12 A novel aspect of our proposal, 
however, is the idea that performance-related incentive schemes should be 
employed as pre-conceived components of project formulation and implemen-
tation. 
In the next two subsections, we discuss how pre-commitments for incen-
tive mechanisms would help ameliorate the basic efficiency problems of 
public enterprises. The bottom line summary is that it is possible to think 
of many reasons why these ·pre-commitments can improve PE performance~· while·; 
by contrast, it is difficult to envision scenarios under which such pre­
commitments can have significant deleterious effects on PE performance. 
10 
A. Benefits from Profit-Sharing Pre-Commitments 
The theoretical literature concerning the effects of profit sharing on 
. f. 1 13work effort is airy sparse. On the one hand, there is the commonly made 
observation that when workers' pay contains a component tied to output or 
profitability, it is bound to increase work effort because increased effort 
is automatically rewarded by increased pay. Offsetting this claim is the 
notion that gain sharing is unlikely to significantly increase effort in 
multi-worker situations because the effect of any one worker's increased 
effort is diluted. Also, there is the idea that if profit sharing was such 
a good method of motivating workers we would see more of it. These criti­
cisms, in turn, have been countered by pointing to important externality 
effects. As an example, it can be shown that the positive effects of gain 
sharing on effort in a multi-worker setting are reinforced in a repeated 
situation where workers can influence, directly or indirectly, each other's 
level of effort. On the whole, this literature raises some of the relevant 
issues but, as is typical in theoretical economic debates, it does not pro­
vide definitive answers. 
On the empirical side, there is some indication that profit sharing is 
associated with increased productivity and profitability. Although it is 
difficult to summarize succinctly the results of well over a dozen studies 
based on different samples and methodologies, the following generalization 
seems fair. It is· typical to find a· significant• raw correlation,,.between 
profit sharing and various signs of a firm's good health, like profitability 
and productivity. When other variables like capital stock, size, etc. are 
controlled for in the regressions, the degree of association weakens. With 
these other factors being included as independent variables in the regres-
11 
sions, profit sharing continues to be significantly associated with increas­
ed productivity and profitability in some studies, while the association is 
statistically insignificant in others. However, no studies we have read 
find a statistically significant negative association between profit sharing 
and productivity or profitability. 
Moving to the .next issue, profit sharing might help to reduce ineffi­
ciencies due to project irreversibility. This is because the major consti­
tuency opposed to scaling back unprofitable public enterprises is the work­
force, which loses jobs that typically have much higher private economic 
value (including better pay) than the next best alternative. The job loss 
issue transcends the immediate work force, because there are regional em­
ployment multipliers. If pay has responded automatically to profitability, 
it has already been lowered (or raised) in some proportion to how badly (or 
well) the enterprise has been performing. In poorly performing enterprises, 
thus, there will be less political will to oppose scaling back, or the scal­
ing back may even occur automatically in extreme cases due to natural labor 
attrition. 
A cynic might ask the following question: if government authorities 
lacked the political will to make pay cuts and scale back operations in the 
first place when the enterprise is doing poorly, and this was a prime cause 
of the problem, why should profit sharing make any difference? The answer 
is that there can be a world of difference between a pre-condition-that all 
parties agreed, on beforehand, and an action that can be interpreted as an 
arbitrary change in the rules of the game. Suppose that the pre-commitment 
to profit sharing is part of the loan package, that many or most loan pack­
ages of this sort contain such a provision, and that all employees must sign 
12 
on to this provision when they sign on to a job in the initially-better­
paying public enterprise. The lower pay that comes with poor performance is 
then part of the game--government authorities can then legitimately claim 
that they never could have gotten the loan package in the first place unless 
they had agreed to ·play by these rules. The acceptance of such rules is 
strengthened the more other players play by them. 
B. Value of Liquidation Flexibility 
The primary role of a liquidation pre-commitment, in our view, is that 
it introduces reversibility into public projects; that is, it makes it pos­
sible to a greater degree for the society to save on future costs by term-
inating a poorly performing PE. Since the value of such flexibility is 
likely to be quite large, and since this topic is somewhat unfamiliar in the 
context of LDC public enterprises, we present an explicit calculation of the 
order of magnitude of the economic gain from reversibility. Our analysis 
is based on a highly stylized model which permits a closed-form solution of 
the "reversibility premium." The qualitative results will not be signifi­
cantly altered if the model is extended to more complicated cases (for which 
one would need to calculate numerical solutions). The underlying methodol­
ogy of working with stochastic diffusion equations is rather typical, 14 
although the application to calculating the appropriate cost-benefit cri­
teria in a project setting has not yet to our knowledge been accomplished 
elsewhere. 
Specifically, we work out a comparison between two investment alterna-
tives--one of which is irreversible and the other partly reversible. These 
. b d . 15a1ternatives are ase on two proJects. One of the projects is irrevers-
ible. This means that once this project is started, it cannot be stopped 
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and must be run through to completion. Suppose that the relevant annual 
discount rate for cost benefit comparisons is r. Let the expected net pres­
ent discounted value of the irreversible project be denoted V, assumed to be 
positive. Thus, from an expected value point of view, the irreversible pro­
ject can be treated as equivalent to a hypothetical infinitely lived project 
having the constant net annual flow value F - Vr. 
The other project is reversible. This means that this project can be 
stopped at any time it is deemed economically desirable. To pose the issue 
sharply, we suppose that only one of the two projects at a time can be 
undertaken (such a condition might come about naturally because of under-
lying constraints). Then the two investment alternatives are: (1) to go 
with the irreversible project forever, or (2) to start with the reversible 
project and go with it unless and until some sufficiently bad outcomes are 
revealed to cause a switch to the irreversible alternative. 
Our aim is to calculate the "option value" of the inherent flexibility 
which the second alternative delivers compared with the first. That is, we 
seek to know what difference reversibility has on traditional cost-benefit 
criteria. Heuristically, we would like to know how much less than their­
reversible project can the reversible project be allowed to pay, and still 
make it more attractive to start off, and continue with, the reversible 
project. This difference is a measure of the option value of the reversi­
bility per se. 
Now, suppose that the.reversible project has the following form.once it 
is initiated. The net income flow follows a random walk·with zero drift and 
annual standard deviation u. This means that if the income flow at the cur­
rent time is X, the distribution of income flow t years hence is normally 
14 
distributed with mean X and standard deviation u/t. If the reversible pro­
ject is chosen initially, then one has the option of bailing out of the 
project if X declines by "too much" over time. If the irreversible project 
is initially selected, then the clock never starts running on the reversible 
project and the irreversible project goes on. 
Under the second investment alternative (that is, when the reversible 
project is initially selected), it can be shown that the optimal stopping 
policy which maximizes expected present discounted value has the following 
intuitive form. The reversible project has a reservation price P associated 
with it such that this project should be chosen over the irreversible pro­
ject if and only if X > P. In other words, if at time zero X(O) ~ P, then 
the irreversible project is chosen. If at time zero X(O) > P then the re-
versible project is chosen initially and continued at any time t so long as 
X(t) > P. At the first instant T when X(T) - P, the reversible project is 
terminated and the irreversible project is initiated. 
The next logic_al question is: what is P? It turns out that 
(1) P = F - a/_fir 
That is, the reservation price P of the reversible project is the difference 
between the "certainty equivalent" F and the "flexibility option value" 
a/./2r. The option value of a given reversible project measures its incre-
mental worth over the hypothetical irreversible alternative of receiving the 
certainty equivalent income forever. The option value is directly propor~· 
tional to the annual standard deviation a 1 which parameterizes the degree 
of uncertainty in the difference between the flexible and inflexible op­
tions. When a reversible project is available, it is chosen with a premium 
15 
that increases in proportion with a because the larger is a the larger is 
the chance of randomly drifting toward a desirably high value of X within a 
relatively short period of time. Hence, the higher is a the more should 
the project maker be inclined to invest in the reversible project even 
though it is currently paying a lower income than the comparable irrevers­
ible project, because information will be revealed relatively quickly, and 
if the reversible project does not drift up in value toward the irreversible 
project, it could always be terminated in favor of the irreversible pro­
ject.16 Equation (1) also shows that the desirability of the reversible 
project is inversely proportional to the discount rate r. The reason is 
simple. With a low enough discount rate, the project selector cannot afford 
not to initially invest in the reversible project (primarily to see whether 
it drifts up in value to be comparable with or better than the irreversible 
project) because there is always the option of shifting to the irreversible 
project if the reversible project turns out badly. 
The following calculation gives some idea of the orders of magnitude 
involved. Suppose the annual standard deviation, a, of the reversible pro­
ject is made higher by a dollar. Then how much lower can the lowest value 
of the annual flow from the reversible project be, and yet leave it profit­
able not to replace the reversible project with the irreversible project. 
From equation (1), the answer is seen to be 1//2r. When r - 5% per annum, 
this value is $3.16. When r - 10% per annum, this tradeoff value is $2.24. 
With numbers like these, it should be easy to appreciate ·why- the standard 
cost-benefit criteria may be seriously distorted when they .do not take into 
proper account the value of reversibility in a project, which is likely to 
be considerably higher than is commonly appreciated. 
16 
Before concluding, it might be useful to comment briefly on the incen-
tive effects of liquidation pre-commitments. Though there do not exist 
theoretical or empirical studies which permit a quantitative assessment of 
the incentive effects in different circumstances, it appears to us a reason­
able presumption that those effects of liquidation pre-commitments which 
might raise the productivity of workers and managers (such as the fear of 
project shut down motivating employees towards greater productivity) are 
likely to outweigh those other effects which might lower productivity (for 
instance, a reduction in job-specific learning due to the fear of job loss). 
Liquidation pre-commitments can also have some desirable indirect ef-
fects on project design and implementation. For instance, often there are 
political pressures on project authorities to choose an uneconomic location 
or an uneconomic technology. Such political pressures are unlikely to dis­
appear, but we suspect that they will be weakened in the presence of liquid­
ation pre-commitments. A different kind of indirect effect of liquidation 
pre-commitment is that it might encourage a more open and extensive discus-
sion, ex-ante, of the downside of a proposed public investment. In this 
process, the project agency as well as the lending agency might become more 
aware of those aspects of project design, financing and institutional cap­
abilities which are central to the future performance of the project. 
C. Implications for Social Cost-Benefit Analysis 
The idea underlying social cost-benefit analysis is simple. A project 
is viewed as a perturbation in the economy, and the overall cost-benefit is 
calculated by imputing the economic or social value to each of the conse­
quences of the project (for instance, on outputs, inputs and foreign 
17
exchange). In practice, the typical approach to dealing with project 
17 
uncertainty has been to do sensitivity analysis with respect to variables 
such as the shadow wage rate, shadow exchange rate and international prices. 
From the point of view of this paper, social cost-benefit analysis can 
be turned into a more active and potent tool for improving the overall re-
turn from public investments. It can be used to calculate the value of 
liquidation pre-commitment by comparing scenarios under which the project 
turns out to perform poorly but cannot be liquidated to those scenarios 
under which there is a substantial probability of the same project being 
liquidated. Our earlier analysis indicates that the net gains from revers­
ibility can be large. What social cost-benefit analysis can do is to impart 
precision to the magnitude of these gains for specific projects. Likewise, 
the scope of cost-benefit analysis can be enlarged to assess how the rate of 
return on a project might be affected by different profit-sharing commit-
ments. 
Actually, the mere requirement that a project evaluation report should 
include an explicit discussion of the reasons why the project might under­
perform, what are the likely associated costs, and what is to be done about 
it, will bring some general pressure to deal with these issues more honest­
ly. More specific calculations from cost-benefit analysis can be used not 
only to assess the economic value of pre-commitments, but also to determine 
the magnitude of preferential treatment to be given to projects which agree 
to build in incentive pre-commitments. In this sense, the modifications in 
cost-benefit··analysis suggested here.are not only of potentially first-order 
magnitude, but also their results have a direct implication on the condi­




Perhaps there is no better way to encourage incentive pre-commitments 
than to make them attractive to project authorities. A lending agency can 
achieve this by adopting a policy of the kind that projects with such pre­
commitments will have to face less stringent hurdles such as a smaller eco­
nomic rate of return required for funding. A similar effect can be achieved 
by making the softness of the loan (that is, the subsidy element in the rate 
of interest and the ease of repayment schedule) dependent on whether and to 
what extent a project agreement incorporates incentive pre-commitments. 
Though the above proposals are more applicable to new projects and in­
vestments, a similar approach may be feasible to some extent for those 
ongoing projects which have future economic potential and which are in need 
of substantial borrowing and expansion. On the other hand, no matter how 
desirable in principle it might be to introduce incentive mechanisms in 
other ongoing projects, we believe it will be much more difficult to per­
suade the project authorities to do this because of the existing implicit 
promise not to threaten job security or pay. This is the basic reason why 
the present paper has placed so much emphasis on incorporating pre­
commitments as political "rules of the game" that are agreed upon right from 
the beginning of a project. 
International organizations can also use their leverage, to some ex­
tent, in policy dialogues to encourage a-more general use of-incentive pre­
commitments (for instance, the use of pre-commitments in projects funded by 
domestic public sources). This might in fact be more attractive than some 
other public enterprise reforms which have been discussed in the past. For 
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instance, reforms concerning the degree and nature of autonomy of public 
enterprises are not only difficult to specify with any precision, but they 
are also difficult to negotiate and monitor for an outside agency. The 
changes in the project approval procedure suggested here, by contrast, are 
easier to implement, even though such changes are not a substitute for 
other reforms. 
B. Performance Criteria 
Since incentive pre-commitments entail that specific actions be under­
taken contingent upon enterprise performance, it is necessary to address the 
question how PE performance should be measured. This question has been 
debated extensively in centrally planned economies and, to some extent, in 
LDCs, even though the typical context of past discussions has been the ex­
18post evaluation of enterprise performance for such purposes as auditing. 
The basic source of controversy in devising a method for evaluation of 
a PE's performance is as follows. There is not that much disagreement on 
the set of potential performance indicators (such as private and public 
profitability, cost-effectiveness, service quality, R+D, secondary employ­
ment generation) which might reflect various aspects of overall performance. 
What is inherently controversial is how to measure indicators which are 
qualitative (such as service quality), whether to use only a few or many 
indicators, and how to weigh different indicators to arrive at a single, 
scalar, measure of overall performance. 
Such controversies should not be surprising -because there are several 
inescapable trade-offs involved. As one example, simplicity and clarity are 
more easily achieved if a few, relatively unambiguous indicators (particu­
larlarly those reflecting financial profitability) are uniformly employed 
20 
across most enterprises. Among the virtues of such an approach are that it 
provides clearer signals (that is, everyone has a clearer understanding of 
the government's expectations concerning pre-commitments), it reduces the 
possibilities of ex-post disputes concerning the interpretation of the 
evaluation method, it imparts a greater consistency in the evaluation of 
different types of enterprises (and thereby reduces the possibilities of 
favoritism and capriciousness), and it is less demanding on administrative 
resources. On the other hand, such an approach may not capture the legi-
timate special circumstances which apply to different PEs, and can thus run 
into conflict with the perception of fairness across enterprises operating 
19under different market conditions and under different policy environments. 
As a result, it is not possible to devise in practice a "perfect" method for 
. evaluating a PE' s performance, even though such a method may be. desirable 
and theoretically feasible. 20 But at the same time, we believe that it is 
not necessary to find a perfect method. In fact, an overextended debate 
about the method o~ evaluating PE performance can easily become counterpro­
ductive. There are at least two reasons for this. 
First, in many circumstances, there is a strong correlation among major 
indicators of an enterprise's performance. That is, if one major indicator 
(say, financial profitability) is showing a low performance for a particular 
enterprise, then it is more likely to be the case than not that some other 
major indicator (say, service quality) also exhibits low performance. One 
consequence of such overlaps among major· indicators is that the marginal 
usefulness of adding one more indicator to the set of indicators on which 
the evaluation is based declines, whereas the corresponding costs increase, 
as the number of indicators in the set increases. 
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Second, it is operationally better to base incentive mechanisms on some 
reasonable measures of performance (theoretically crude though they might be 
for the reasons stated above) than not to have incentive mechanisms at all. 
That is, the "imperfections" of measurement criteria should not be used as 
an excuse not to encourage incentive mechanisms and accountability as a part 
of the project approval process. This is because the social gains from hav­
ing incentive mechanisms (which we discussed earlier) would in general 
compensate for the crudeness of performance measures. 
C. Institutional Mechanism 
Implementation of incentive pre-commitments would require the institu­
tional mechanism and capability to undertake routine ex-post evaluation of 
projects. To a very limited degree, the experience of ex-post evaluation 
exists in some LDCs and multilateral organizations. Sample evaluations have 
been undertaken, for instance, for the purpose of auditing and for learning 
. 21
f rom past experience. More recently, there have also been some limited 
attempts to evaluat·e the sustainability of a sample of projects (that is, 
whether a particular project is capable of generating a satisfactory flow of 
22net economic benefits). To implement pre-commitments, however, there would 
be a need for a more comprehensive and a more clearly defined institutional 
process of ex-post evaluation. While such extensive ex-post evaluation is 
desirable by itself, it should be recognized that a certain extra potential 
for controversy is inherent in the task of implementing pre-commitments. 
This is because the·-judgment · on whether or not a particular ·pre-commitment 
is being satisfied will have direct operational consequences. Yet, the over­
all controversy associated with the consequent remedial actions could be 
significantly less than that in the case where corresponding remedial 
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actions are attempted without pre-commitments of the kind discussed in this 
paper. 
Finally, a central objective of incentive schemes is to alter the as­
sumptions under which workers and managers of PEs operate and to change--to 
the extent possible--the economic environment of public enterprises. This 
objective might be more easily achieved if extensive publicity is given on 
an ongoing basis to the relative performance of public enterprises and to 
the government's responses to different levels of performance. Such public­
ity can serve as an important source of motivation to the top management of 
PEs. More importantly, PEs operate under a complex political environment 
where public support is important for the success of most policies which 
concern worker compensation and employment. Such support is more likely to 
be forthcoming if the public is aware of what the policy is and how it is 
being implemented. 
V. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS 
A. Credibility of Implementation 
There are many examples of LDC governments announcing policy changes 
and then, under political pressure, altering the changes or reverting back 
to earlier policy. Given such a track record, it is reasonable to argue 
that: (i) even if pre-commitments are undertaken for a set of projects, a 
government may invent ways to circumvent their implementation, and (ii) even 
if. a, government intends to_ implement a pre-commitment, .· this possibility 
might not be taken seriously by employees and other interested parties and, 
correspondingly, the incentive effects of the pre-commitment may be diluted. 
These problems are simply a reflection of the political economy of the 
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public sector. It is possible however that the presence of third parties 
(in particular, multilateral organizations) can ameliorate such problems. 
There are at least two reasons for this. First, the presence of third par­
ties might make it more desirable for the government to implement a pre­
commitment, at least to the extent that the ongoing relationship with third 
parties is considered valuable by the government. Second, in those cases 
where a government does wish to impose discipline on PEs, it might be helped 
by the presence of third parties. For instance, in its attempt to liquidate 
a poorly performing PE, a government might find it desirable to emphasize 
that its "hands are tied" by the existing pre-commitments. 
B. Manipulation by Managers 
A reasonable question is whether the introduction of incentive pre­
commitments would induce managers and employees of PEs to manipulate the en­
vironment (for example, to seek greater protection from international compe­
tition) so that the resulting economic outcome is worse than that without 
pre-commitment. Conceptually this is possible, but it is unlikely,for sev­
eral reasons. First, most of the manipulations which can potentially take 
place, given the political setup, are perhaps already taking place. Second, 
the presence of well-publicized pre-commitments might have an effect of 
bringing a greater degree of public scrutiny to the demands exerted by 
employees of the public sector which, in turn, may reduce the degree to 
which these demands are satisfied. Finally, even in the extreme case where 
the government does not .intend· .to -take advantage of .. the - disciplinary-oppor­
tuni ties offered by pre-commitments, perhaps the worst that can happen is 
that government policies would be altered to negate the potential positive 
consequences of incentive mechanisms. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Among reviews emphasizing different aspects are Baumol (1980), Floyd, 
et al. (1984), Gillis, et al. (1983, Ch. 21), Jones (1982) and Nellis 
(1986). Also, it is not necessary for our purpose to be rigid about 
the definition of a PE, because the main issues we emphasize apply to a 
broad range of publicly invested and publicly controlled organizations 
(except perhaps short-term public projects devoted exclusively to 
creating infrastructure). For definitions of PEs, see Bohm (1981) and 
Jones (1982). 
2. For instance, a recent summary based on a cross-country sample showed 
that PEs have a lower profitability than the corresponding private 
enterprises in each of the eight industrial subsectors under consider­
ation. See Ayub and Hegstad (1987, pp. 84 and 86). 
3. A method to evaluate some of the macroeconomic consequences of PE per­
formance is discussed in Floyd, et al. (1984). 
4. See Sah (1983)° for an analysis of the limitations on redistribution 
through pricing or through taxation and subsidization of goods. See 
Sah (1986) for a more general analysis. 
5. For preliminary data showing that this is the case in many sub-Saharan 
countries, see Nellis (1986). For a discussion of some of the experi­
ences of divestiture, see Berg (1985). 
6. See standard texts such as Varian (1984) and Atkinson and Stiglitz 
(1980). 
7. See Leibenstein (1976) for references. 
8. Kornai (1980) has written extensively about the effects of soft budget 
constraints on state enterprises in Eastern European style economies. 
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9. See Weitzman (1987) for a rigorous presentation of this argument. 
10. As James Tobin has quipped in a somewhat different context: "It takes 
a heap of Harberger triangles to fill an Okun gap." Among the earliest 
studies of allocational efficiency losses are those of Harberger (1964, 
1966). Since then this matter has been empirically studied in a vari­
ety of settings. 
11. A recent calculation of such differences in productivity is by Bergson 
(1987) who shows that the output per worker in a sample of socialist 
economies is lower by more than 25 percent compared to that in a sample 
of western market economies, even after the outputs have been adjusted 
for differences in capital and land per worker. 
12. It has been tried in some cases on a consistent basis, most recently 
in South Korea, with success. See Park (1986). 
13. See for example the summary in Estrin, Jones and Svejnar (1987). 
14. See Brennan and Schwartz (1985), Majd and Pindyck (1987) and McDonald 
and Siegel (19~6). 
15. The analysis could be extended to several different projects. 
16. This result may appear somewhat counterintuitive in the sense that a 
reversible project has greater relative premium if the uncertainty, a, 
is larger. The reason, as indicated above, is that a larger a in-
creases the "optimal value" or "flexibility value" of starting with a 
reversible project. This and other qualitative results hold, in suit­
ably modified form, even if the investment choice is based on expected 
utility maximization under risk aversion rather than on expected value 
maximization. 
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17. For recent reviews of cost-benefit analysis and project evaluation, 
see Srinivasan (1982) and Dreze and Stern (1987). 
18. In the literature of centrally planned economies, this is typically 
referred to as the problem of "success indicators." See, for example, 
Berliner (1976) for discussion and further references. For a recent 
summary of the conventional economic difficulties in measuring public 
sector output, see Stiglitz (1986, Ch. 7). 
19. Such an approach also does not deal adequately with the issue of basing 
the performance measure on factors under a PE's control while stripping 
out the effects of factors outside the PE's control. The stripping of 
some of the latter factors is possible and desirable (such as input and 
output taxes and subsidies implicit in pricing policies) while it is 
intrinsically difficult to do so for other factors (such as conse­
quences of government policies on technology imports). 
20. In principle, it is possible to measure the public profitability of a 
PE based on shadow prices derived from social cost-benefit analysis. 
However, the complexity of such a measure increases markedly especially 
if the full general equilibrium effects are traced out. Also, since 
shadow prices depend on the underlying model of the economy, the needs 
of contractual arrangements (e.g., clarity and 
require not only an articulation of the model, 
of the same model for several years. 
21. See World Bank (1986). 
22. See World Bank (1985). 
standardization) would 
but also the retention 
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